Antilizer: Run Time Self-Healing Security for Wireless Sensor Networks by Tomic, Ivana et al.
Antilizer: Run Time Self-Healing Security for Wireless Sensor
Networks
Ivana Tomić, Po-Yu Chen, Michael J. Breza and Julie A. McCann
Imperial College London, Department of Computing
London, United Kingdom
{i.tomic,po-yu.chen11,michael.breza04,j.mccann}@imperial.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) applications range from domestic
Internet of Things systems like temperature monitoring of homes
to the monitoring and control of large-scale critical infrastructures.
The greatest risk with the use of WSNs in critical infrastructure is
their vulnerability to malicious network level attacks. Their radio
communication network can be disrupted, causing them to lose or
delay data which will compromise system functionality. This paper
presents Antilizer, a lightweight, fully-distributed solution to enable
WSNs to detect and recover from common network level attack
scenarios. In Antilizer each sensor node builds a self-referenced
trust model of its neighbourhood using network overhearing. The
node uses the trust model to autonomously adapt its communica-
tion decisions. In the case of a network attack, a node can make
neighbour collaboration routing decisions to avoid affected regions
of the network. Mobile agents further bound the damage caused by
attacks. These agents enable a simple notification scheme which
propagates collaborative decisions from the nodes to the base sta-
tion. A filtering mechanism at the base station further validates
the authenticity of the information shared by mobile agents. We
evaluate Antilizer in simulation against several routing attacks. Our
results show that Antilizer reduces data loss down to 1% (4% on
average), with operational overheads of less than 1% and provides
fast network-wide convergence.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Embedded systems security; Trust
frameworks; • Computer systems organization → Sensor net-
works;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are systems that consist of many
small, resource constrained sensor nodes. WSNs have been suc-
cessfully applied to many Internet of Things applications provid-
ing ubiquitous connectivity and information-gathering capabilities
[16, 19]. The natural evolution of WSNs is to make them part of
larger systems. These systems use WSN data as input to other pro-
cesses. Example systems include smart infrastructure systems such
as water/waste distribution networks, precision agriculture farms,
and energy distribution grids [17, 22].
The risk of the inclusion ofWSNs into larger systems is that their
operational environment is often open to the public, and difficult
to secure. WSNs rely on radio networks that are easy to disrupt
and subvert. This makes them a potential target for cyber-attacks
[12]. Attacks can be simple radio level attacks such as jamming,
or more sophisticated network level attacks where one or more
sensor nodes are compromised and made to behave in a malicious
manner. Attacks can cause data loss and increase data collection
latency which will disrupt the functioning of the system that relies
upon data collected by the WSN [27].
Extensive research efforts have been put into hardeningWSNnet-
work protocols with the use of various cryptographic mechanisms
and pairwise key sharing schemes (e.g. [11, 20, 29]) or building in-
trusion detection schemes (e.g. [1, 7, 14]). These approaches do not
provide a mechanism for a WSN to recover from malicious intru-
sion nor prevent disruption to the WSN or the application relying
on data collected by the WSN. Recent attacks such as Mirai [13]
have shown the very real danger of WSNs being attacked by rouge
nodes and that this problem has not yet been effectively solved. The
challenge lies in the fact that the severe resource constraints and
uncontrolled operational environments of sensor nodes weaken
the effectiveness of current state-of-the-art security techniques.
Very few security approaches address both intrusion detection
and autonomous intrusion prevention for WSNs [15, 23, 25]. The
few that do, rely on an evaluation of a node’s behaviour from either
locally or globally collected information. The global information
approach is done at the base-station which creates scalability limits
and provides a single point of failure to an attacker. The local infor-
mation approach is done at the node level and combines surveillance
techniques, such as overhearing and probing, and collaborations
among the nodes such as voting. The greatest weakness of the local
approach is that the information shared by collaborating nodes
can be easily falsified. We argue that a node ’trusting data from its
neighbours’ introduces an additional attack vector to be exploited.
A much more robust security approach should only use information
that is collected, and therefore trusted, by the node itself. The chal-
lenges are how to interpret potentially noisy data and successfully
categorise malicious events from routine network changes.
In this paper, we present Antilizer, a run-time security solu-
tion for WSNs that is able to detect network level attacks and at
the same time adapt its communication decisions to avoid the af-
fects of the detected attack. Antilizer utilizes a self-referenced trust
model at each node to evaluate the behaviour of its one-hop neigh-
bours. Neighbour communication information is self-collected via
network overhearing which is a data collection method that is
difficult to falsify. This allows us to collect network metrics by
counting the number of transmissions, receptions and other com-
munication events without using the content of the communication.
The network metrics are mapped to a trust value using a kernel-
based technique. This notion of trust is used by a node when it
makes communication decisions regarding node collaboration (e.g.
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data routing, data aggregation) or environmental awareness (e.g.
adaptive duty cycling based on received signal strengths). In the
example of data routing, self-referenced trust ensures that commu-
nication avoids affected areas to prevent its loss during a network
level attack. The main difference between our self-referenced trust
model and existing trust-based models is that ours depends only
on self-collected information, rather than on potentially dishonest
information provided by other nodes.
Upon detection of a malicious neighbour, there is the need to
send the position of the malicious node to the base station. We use
an agent-based notification scheme that introduces ANTs (Antilizer
Notification Tickets). The ANT travels to the base station and in-
forms nodes along the way that changes in the network behaviour
are the result of malicious activity. The ANTs reduce the number
of false positive detections and constrain the damage of the attack
to a single neighbourhood in the network. The authenticity of the
information carried by the ANT is verified at the base station via a
filtering mechanism.
The contributions of the paper are as follows:
(1) A self-referenced trust model which enables each node
to build knowledge about its neighbourhood using only self-
collected information and map this knowledge to a trust
model of its neighbourhood using a kernel-based approach
to generate a trust value for each neighbour.
(2) An agent-based notification scheme which distributes
information in the network to ensure the normal network
operation upon the detection of an attack. Our scheme over-
comes the problem of distinguishing between genuine and
malicious network level changes and provides a global view
of network behaviour essential for complete network recov-
ery.
(3) A filteringmechanism at the base stationwhich verifies
the authenticity of the information distributed by the agent-
based notification scheme.
(4) An implementation of Antilizer in the Contiki operating
system [6]. Its effectiveness and efficiency is evaluated in the
case of node collaboration for secure data routing.
Antilizer is agnostic to WSN operating system and routing lay-
ers and achieves low overheads of less than 1% on average and
a detection reliability of 99.3%. It was evaluated on various sized
networks, against different attack scenarios and at a range of attack
intensities. Antilizer does not require off-line processing or training,
provides a guarantee of zero performance penalty in the presence
of no attack, and is an inspiration for further exploration of the use
of learning-based methods on sensor nodes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 sur-
veys the related work. Sec. 3 discusses the system model and our
assumptions. Sec. 4 gives an overview of Antilizer. The design de-
tails are given in Sec. 5, Sec 6 and Sec. 7. In Sec. 8 and Sec. 9 we
present the implementation and evaluation of Antilizer, respectively.
We end the paper in Sec. 10 with brief concluding remarks.
2 RELATEDWORK
Antilizer is a combination of two broad categories of security sys-
tems for WSNs, trust-based and automated response systems.
Trust-based security schemes. There is a large body of theo-
retical and practical results for WSN trust-based security schemes.
These use the approach of monitoring neighbours for behavioural
anomalies to achieve reliable network communication [8, 28]. We
only discuss schemes that use network metrics in a similar way to
Antilizer.
Trust-based methods such as [26] work in a centralized manner
which requires a global view of the network. All of the network
information for each node has to be passed to the base station for
processing. This approach assumes that the data can be safely sent
to and returned from the base station and that the base station
can handle the processing for the entire network. Antilizer does
not have these limitations because each node creates its own trust
model of its neighbours. This fully distributed approach improves
scalability, lowers energy consumption and makes the solution less
vulnerable to malicious activity.
Fully distributed schemes [2, 4, 5, 10] exist that use different met-
rics to evaluate trustworthiness. Network-based indication schemes
[4, 10] are trust management protocols that use metrics in the same
way as Antilizer. The scheme presented in [10] can only detect a
single attack (selective forwarding) due to its use of single metric
(forwarding indication). Antilizer uses more metrics and can de-
tect a wider range of attacks. The scheme presented in [4] detects
a wider range of attacks. Antilizer has much better performance
than [4], it has a higher rate of detection of malicious nodes and is
better able to mitigate the effects of attacks by maintaining a higher
packet-delivery ratio across the network.
We do not compare ourselves to the schemes presented in [2, 5]
because they use metrics collected from neighbour nodes with the
assumption that the information that they receive is trustworthy.
This assumption is dangerous because a malicious node can provide
false information and subvert both schemes. Antilizer uses network
metrics that it has collected itself using overhearing of its local
neighbours without using the content of the communication. This
approach prevents malicious nodes from spreading false informa-
tion in the network. In [23], the authors propose a scheme to filter
false recommendation created by dishonest nodes. This scheme is
limited to only detect attacks that falsify information, and can not
detect attacks that subvert a network in other ways, such as not
following a protocol.
Automated response systems. There are very few WSN secu-
rity schemes that detect attacks and prevent the disruption from the
attack. Antilizer does both. Examples of systems that do provide an
automated response upon detecting malicious activity are [15, 25].
Neither scheme is trust based, in contrast to Antilizer.
Kinesis [25] uses policy specification to select an appropriate re-
sponse to a detected attack. The selected response action is based on
a voting scheme which requires interaction and message exchange
between nodes in the same neighbourhood. The final decision to
revoke or reprogram a node is made only by the base station. This
approach can be slow to detect an attack, and can itself be compro-
mised by altering communication with the base station or using
dishonest nodes.
The work in [15] addresses queue-based protocols. It monitors
the queues to detect metric deviation and discover malicious be-
haviour. This approach cannot be adapted to distance vector routing
protocols such as RPL without the addition of queues. Antilizer
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monitors a larger range of metrics than just message queue lengths,
and is therefore responsive to a greater variety of attack types or
behavioural changes.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
Before we present the security architecture of Antilizer, we define
its system model and our assumptions.
Network Model.We consider a WSN that has multiple devices
N = S ∪ R communicating in a multi-hop fashion, where S is the
set of all sensor nodes generating and relaying data packets, and R
is the set of all roots/base stations collecting data packets from the
network. In this paper we only use one base station R. The network
operates over a finite-horizon period consisting of discrete time slots
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , tf }, tf < ∞. We define Nx (t) ⊆ N to be the set of
one-hop neighbours that node x ∈ N can communicate with during
time slot t . The network is modelled as a time-varying weighted
graph G(N ,L). L is the set of all possible wireless links for the
node pairs x ,y ∈ N . The entry (x ,y) ∈ L is the communication
link between the source node x and the destination node y.
Security Model.We consider the base station as trusted with a
secure mechanism of disseminating updates (use of cryptographic
keys or secure channels) to the network. The base station makes
the final decision on whether to initiate a request for revoking
or reprogramming potentially malicious nodes. Even with secure
communication from the base station, any individual sensor may
become untrusted and potentially malicious over time. We assume
that each node trusts itself. The majority of nodes in any neigh-
bourhood are non-malicious. The existence of a majority of non-
malicious nodes ensures the existence of at least one alternative,
non-malicious, route to the base station.
Threat Model. Assuming the OSI network architecture model
as it is applied to WSN, we address attacks specific to the network
layer. This layer provides data routing for network communication.
Attacks at this layer aim to reduce or delay the flow of sensor data
to the base station [27]. An attacker disrupts the flow of data by
undertaking one or more of the following malicious activities:
• Falsify information - The attacker intentionally sends false
information to other nodes to affect their routing decisions.
Examples include the sinkhole (node advertises the false
rank) and sybil attacks (node presents multiple identities
in the network). Both attacks result in the compromise of
transmission routes.
• Fail to transmit - The attacker does not obey routing deci-
sions and fails to act as a router for its neighbours. This
attack degrades successful data reception by the base station.
Examples range from the most severe case of failing to for-
ward any data packets in the case of blackhole attack, to the
selective forwarding attack where data of only a small set of
neighbours is forwarded.
• Data Injection - The attacker can inject false information,
replay overheard information, or flood the network with a
high rate of communication. This attack forces the nodes
to waste energy due to increased message reception and
interference in the network. The result reduces the ability
of the network to carry useful data to the base station.
While we aim to cover the major network level attacks for WSN
we realize that this categorization is not exhaustive nor can be
given the very nature of security. The approach that we present
is engineered to be extensible to new attacks and can be updated
when new security issues arise over time. We assume that the
percentage of the network affected by an attack is dependant upon
the percentage of the network nodes that have become malicious.
The percentage of malicious nodes varies from non-intrusive (1%
to 3%) to intrusive (up to 10%).
4 OVERVIEW OF ANTILIZER
In this section we introduce Antilizer, a novel self-healing security
solution for WSNs. Each node collects information to create a trust
model of their neighbours. If a node detects any malicious activity
from one of its neighbours, it changes its trust of its neighbour,
and adapts its communication decisions based on that trust. When
a malicious node is detected, it notifies the base station with the
ID of the suspected node. The base station then authenticates this
network security information. Antilizer arranges these tasks into
five modules, each briefly explained below and depicted in Fig. 1.
Information Collection. Each node uses its own radio to over-
hear the communication and collect information such as a number
of transmissions, number of receptions, for each neighbour. This in-
formation is recorded every time slot t , as mentioned in the network
model. These network metrics are used to build a profile of each
neighbour in reception range. As network metrics are overheard
without using the content of the communication, the node can not
be affected by dishonest information shared by its neighbours.
Trust Inference. The collected information is used as an input
to the Expected Similarity Estimation method (EXPoSE) [24]. In
Antilizer we adapt this method to the resource constraints of sensor
nodes by the use of approximations to reduce the storage complex-
ity. The node uses the expected similarity of collected information
sets over time to infer a trust value for each neighbour. A neighbour
is considered trusted if the two consecutive sets are similar, or the
difference between two consecutive sets is small. If two consecutive
sets are not similar, their difference will be large, and the associated
node will be considered malicious.
Detection and Adaptation. Large changes in the collected in-
formation of a neighbour over time indicates malicious behaviour.
This causes the detecting node to reduce its trustworthiness to-
wards that neighbour. Accordingly, the node autonomously adapts
its decisions regarding collaboration with that less trusted neigh-
bour. We illustrate this via an example of data routing. The node
maps neighbour trust values to a weight used in the routing algo-
rithm’s objective function. Less trusted neighbours are punished
and the data is routed around those neighbours.
Notification. Trust models are built in a completely distributed
way, each node has a unique view of the network. To strengthen an
individual node’s judgement and prevent the disruption of the net-
work, nodes need to inform the base station of potential malicious
nodes, and their neighbours of changes to the network caused by
suspected malicious behaviour. Antilizer uses a simple but smart
notification scheme where information is spread by mobile agents.
Consider a routing example. When a node detects an anomalous
behaviour in its current parent neighbour (the node to which it
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Figure 1: The Antilizer architecture.
routes data), the neighbour will be punished by low trust value. The
node will then change its parent from that neighbour to another
with a higher trust. After it changes parents, it triggers an ANT that
travels along the route from the node to the base station carrying
the ID of the potentially malicious parent. The ANT also informs
the neighbours of the new parent that its metrics will be changing
in the short term due to a potential security issue. In this example,
ANTs bound the damage caused by an attack and stop the spread
of distrust in the network.
Information Authentication. The information that is passed
by an ANTs to the base station is used to determine an appropriate
reaction to a potentially malicious node, such as to revoke or reboot
that node. To verify the authenticity of the information, we use a
filtering mechanism. If the information is verified as correct, the
malicious node will be punished. Otherwise, the information will
be discarded and considered as malicious, and as an indication of
further malicious activity.
A detailed description of individual modules is given in the
further sections.
5 A SELF-REFERENCED TRUST MODEL TO
DETECT POTENTIALLY MALICIOUS NODES
This section describes the Antilizer trust model in detail. First, we
give an explanation of the network metrics used for neighbourhood
surveillance and our method of collecting information through
overhearing. Then, we present in detail how we use the network
metrics with the EXPoSE method to infer trust.
5.1 Neighbourhood Surveillance with Network
Overhearing
WSN nodes make communication decisions regarding collabora-
tion with a neighbour node without taking into account that the
neighbour might become malicious and violate the underlying pro-
tocol rules. For example, a malicious neighbour can alter data or
falsify shared information. To address this problem, we introduce
trustworthiness as an additional metric to be used by a node when
making these decisions.
Network Overhearing.Nodes collect network behaviour infor-
mation for all of their one-hop neighbours. Information collection
is done by overhearing radio packet transmissions in their recep-
tion range even if they are not intended recipients [18]. The use
Figure 2: The overhearing phenomenon.
Table 1: Network metrics retrieved via overhearing
Metrics Description
Tx the number of packets the node y transmitted to its
neighbours
Rx/Tx the ratio of the number of received and the number of
transmitted packets at node y (forwarding indication)
Rank the average rank of the node y
of overheard information does not guarantee the capture of all
one-hop neighbour information. Fig. 2 illustrates where node B can
overhear packets sent from D to E; however, it cannot hear any
packets that E might have received from G. Additionally, leaf nodes
such as G, do not perform any forwarding tasks; thus not all of their
metric can be measured. Despite these limitations, the information
collected using network overhearing is sufficient to describe nodes’
behaviour and infer their trust values.
Network Metrics. The use of overhearing overcomes the prob-
lem of using potentially dishonest information. Node x trusts only
itself and the information that it can overhear without using the
content of the communication. This information is stored as a set
of network metrics. Table 1 lists the metrics collected by node x for
each of its one-hop neighbours y ∈ Nx (t) within a given time slot.
These are added to a network metric vector vx,y (t) ∈ Rd at every
time slot t , where d = 3 is the number of metrics.
5.2 Temporal Similarity of Network Metrics
The network metrics collected via overhearing change over time.
They do not follow a specific distribution. The use of a parametric
solution, such as a Gaussian distribution, reduces the reliability
of the results obtained. Instead of assuming a certain distribution,
we exploit a state-of-the-art non-parametric technique called the
Expected Similarity Estimation method (EXPoSE) [24]. We choose
ExPoSE because of its proven accuracy and its ability to be al-
tered to work on low-power devices such as sensor nodes. We use
EXPoSE with a set of approximations to reduce its storage require-
ments. Without these approximations EXPoSe would be unusable
on resource-restricted sensor nodes.
Network Metrics Similarity. In the EXPoSE method, the net-
work metrics are combined into a vector vx,y (t) for each time slot
t . The vectors are then mapped into Hilbert spaceH . The mapping
is done using the function ϕ at every time slot t . The change be-
tween two consecutive vectors is described through the expected
similarity measure defined below.
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Definition 1 (Expected similarity). Given a node x and y ∈
Nx (t), the expected similarity between the vector vx,y (t) at time t
and its previous version at time (t − i), vx,y (t − i), for i = 1, 2, ...,n
with n being the number of past vectors, is defined as
η(vx,y (t)) =
n∑
i=1
k(vx,y (t), vx,y (t − i))
=
n∑
i=1
⟨ϕ(vx,y (t)),ϕ(vx,y (t − i))⟩. (1)
The kernel function k(·, ·) computes the inner product of two vectors
in Rd after mapping them into higher dimensional Hilbert space
H ∈ Rd ′(d ′ ≥ d) through a mapping function ϕ(·). The term ⟨·, ·⟩
denotes the inner product of the two vectors. For more information
regarding the definition of the kernel function, we refer readers to [9].
Although the kernel function k(·, ·) allows the computation of
the inner product without ’visiting’ the high dimensional Hilbert
spaceH , it does not support the computation of the inner product
in an incremental manner. The computation of the inner product
in a incremental way is important to the implementation of this
method on resource-constrained sensor nodes. Incremental updates
allow the accurate capture of the data stream dynamics of vx,y (t)
in way that requires minimal computation and storage. This is
achieved because η(vx,y (t)) does not have to be recomputed at
every time slot t . We realise incremental updates through the use
of a kernel approximation (KEA) vector which we defined below.
KEA Vector. By using the KEA vector, µx,y (t), Eq. (1) becomes:
η(vx,y (t)) = ⟨ϕ(vx,y (t)), 1
n
n∑
i=1
ϕ(vx,y (t − i))⟩
= ⟨ϕ(vx,y (t)), µx,y (t)⟩ (2)
where µx,y (t) can be updated in an incremental manner as:
µx,y (t) = γϕ(vx,y (t − 1)) + (1 − γ )µx,y (t − 1). (3)
The term γ ∈ [0, 1] denotes an automatic decay factor that controls
the speed at which the trust metric will change to the occurrence
of new information. A larger γ results in the faster decay of past
information.
The KEA vector µx,y (t) is computed using the overheard net-
work metrics collected in previous time slots, vx,y (t ′), where t ′ < t .
The metrics used for the update of µx,y (t) need to come from a
trusted, non-malicious node. The network metrics generated from
potentially malicious nodes are detectable when they first occur
because the difference between the current and past metrics will
be large. As time continues µx,y (t) will change to incorporate the
new network metrics.
To prevent the adaptation of µx,y (t) to a malicious node we
define a parameterα to determinewhich overheard networkmetrics
get included in the KEA vector. When η(vx,y (t)) > α the network
metrics for that time slot t will not be used to update the KEA
vector, (i.e. µx,y (t) = µx,y (t − 1)), as the new behaviour is likely to
be malicious. According to our extensive simulations in Sec. 9.3,
α ∈ [0.7, 0.9] ensures the detection of more than 98.6% anomalies
with low rate of false positives (∼ 3.6%) (see Fig. 10).
Mapping Function Approximation.We use the radial basis
function (RBF) [9] as the kernel function to compute KEA. RBF has
Figure 3: Approximation of the mapping function ϕˆ(vx,y (t))
results in 2m elements.
been widely used in many machine learning applications, including
non-parametric regression, clustering and neural networks. We
can not directly use RBF because it transforms data vectors into
an infinite dimensional space (i.e. ϕ(vx,y (t)) ∈ R∞ and µx,y (t) ∈
R∞) whose storage would exceed that of a sensor node. We fix
this problem with the use of a Monte Carlo approximation of the
RBF mapping function. An inverse Fourier transform is used to
approximate the Gaussian RBF kernel [21]. The approximation
function ϕˆ(v) is given by the Euler equation:
ϕˆ(vx,y (t)) = 1√
m
exp(iZvx,y(t)) (4)
where i denotes the imaginary unit (i2 = −1), Z is am × d matrix
where each elementZi, j ∼ N(0, 1/σ 2), andm represents the number
of Monte Carlo samples. The operation in Eq. 4 is depicted in Fig. 3.
The Euler equation results in 2m elements where the odd elements
store the real parts and the even elements store the imaginary parts
of the complex number. The expected similarity η(vx,y (t)) in Eq. 2
then becomes:
η(vx,y (t)) ≈ ⟨ϕˆ(vx,y (t)), 1
n
n∑
i=1
ϕˆ(vx,y (t − i))⟩ (5)
where 1/n∑ni=1 ϕˆ(vx,y (t−i)) is computed in an incremental manner
with Eq. (3).
The expected similarity computation method which uses Monte
Carlo approximation is given in Alg. 1. The computational complex-
ity of Alg. 1 reduces from O(mnd) to O(m logd) for all t , wherem
denotes the number of Monte Carlo samples, n denotes the number
of past vectors, and d denotes the number of network metrics ob-
tained at every time t [24]. This reduction in complexity is a result
of ϕ(vx,y (·)) not having to be recomputed in each time slot. Note
that, η(vx,y (t)) ∈ [0, 1] is normalized by the 1/√m in Eq. (4).
In the next section we show how the similarity measure is
mapped to a trust value and used to enhance the objective function
of the routing algorithm.
6 APPLICATION OF THE SELF-REFERENCED
TRUST MODEL TO DATA ROUTING
In this section we describe how the trust, computed from the simi-
larity measure of network metrics, is used in the routing algorithm
to affect routing decisions. The routing is an example of node col-
laboration where communication decisions can be based on the
notion of trust. First, we discuss the class of routing protocols that
can benefit from our scheme. Then, we show how our trust metric
can be used by a routing algorithm objective function to avoid areas
affected by a network level attack.
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Algorithm 1: Expected similarity η(vx,y (t)) computation
Input :vx,y (t ): the network metrics of y observed from x at time t
µx,y (t ): the KEA vector of y observed from x at time t
σ 2: the standard deviation for Monte Carlo sampling
z: the vector ofm Gaussian samples from Z (0, 1/σ 2)
α , γ : the parameters to control KEA vector adaptation
Output :η(vx,y (t )): the expected similarity of the network metrics of
y observed from x at time t
1 ϕˆ(vx,y (t )) ← 0, µx,y (1) ← ϕˆ(vx,y (1)), η(vx,y (t )) ← 0
2 /* STEP 1: mapping function approximation */
3 for j ⇐ 1, 2...,m do
4 ϕˆj (vx,y (t )) ← 1√m exp(iz · vx,y (t ))
5 end
6 /* STEP 2: compute expected similarity */
7 η(vx,y (t )) ← ⟨ϕ(vx,y (t )), µx,y (t )⟩
8 /* STEP 3: update KEA vector for time t + 1 */
9 if k > 1 and η(vx,y (t )) < α then
10 µx,y (t ) = γϕ(vx,y (t − 1)) + (1 − γ )µx,y (t − 1)
11 end
12 return η(vx,y (t ))
6.1 Distance Vector Routing Protocols: RPL as
an Example
Antilizer can be applied to any distance-vector routing protocol
where a distance measure (e.g. hop count, or respective link qual-
ities) is used to determine the best packet forwarding route. In
this paper we use RPL (Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy
Networks) [3]. RPL is a standardized IPv6-based multi-hop routing
solution widely used in WSNs. It is an appropriate protocol for the
evaluation of Antilizer because it requires an objective function
where the trustworthiness can be added as an additional metric.
It is important to mention that Antilizer affects only the objective
function; therefore, it can be easily applied to any other routing
protocol based on a distance-based objective function.
An objective function defines how a node translate one or more
network metrics and constraints into a Rank value. Rank is used to
determine the best neighbour to forward data to the base station.
The Rank between the node x and its neighboursy ∈ Nx (t) is given
by
Rankx(t) =
{ min
y∈Nx (t )
(px,y (t) + Ranky(t)) x < R
RootRankx x ∈ R
(6)
wherepx,y (t) > 0 denotes the penalty of using the link (x ,y) at time
slot t , and RootRankx ≥ 0 is the smallest Rank value in the routing
tree. The smallest Rank value in a correctly operating network
belongs to the root x .
Themrhof objective function is used in the Contiki implemen-
tation of RPL. It defines px,y (t) as a moving average function that
uses the expected number of transmissions (ETX) as the routing
measure [6]:
px,y (t) = ALPHApx,y (t − 1) + (1 − ALPHA)ETXx,y (t) (7)
where ALPHA = {0.15, 0.3}. In our work we add the trustworthi-
ness of individual nodes to the routing measure. This enhanced
objective function is given next.
Figure 4: Hyperbolic cosecant function with k = 6.
6.2 Trust-based RPL Objective Function
The expected similarity η(vx,y (t)) of the network metric vector
vx,y (t) at time t is included in the Rank computation in Eq. (6)
through the link penalty function in Eq. (7). It is included as subjec-
tive ’penalty’, or weighting function, called the Subjective Trust.
Definition 2 (Subjective Trust). Given a node x and its one-
hop neighbour y ∈ Nx (t), the subjective trust τx,y (t) is the penalty
that x gives to y at time t . Its value is defined through the hyperbolic
function:
τx,y (t) = −csch(kη(vx,y (t)) − k) + csch(−k) + 1 (8)
where csch(·) denotes the hyperbolic cosecant function, and k is a
parameter used to control the detection sensitivity of our solution.
This function provides the continuous transient where τx,y (t) ≈
1 for all η(vx,y (t)) ≤ α . For η(vx,y (t)) > α , the value of τx,y (t)
grows exponentially. By adjusting α and k , the sensitivity of the
scheme can be controlled. Fig. 4 illustrates the hyperbolic function
where α = 0.75 and k = 6. Function f (x) takes as an input the
expected similarity η(vx,y (t)) obtained in Alg. 1 and it returns the
subjective trust τx,y (t).
As can be observed from Def. 2, τx,y (t) is bounded between 1
and∞, i.e. τx,y (t) ∈ [1,∞]. τx,y (t) = 1 indicates that nodey is 100%
trustworthy from the perspective of node x . Large values of τx,y (t)
indicate the reduction of trustworthiness towards the node y. This
measure of the trustworthiness of individual nodes is then used as
a weighting function in the link penalty function px,y (t) in Eq. (7):
pˆx,y (t ) = ALPHApˆx,y (t − 1) + (1 − ALPHA)τx,y (t )ETXx,y (t ). (9)
The addition of trustworthiness directly affects a nodes routing
decisions and ensures that it avoids malicious nodes so that the
flow of data is not obstructed during an attack.
Remark 1 (Zero performance penalty in no attack sce-
nario). The hyperbolic function illustrated in Fig. 4 ensures a high
penalty when potentially malicious behaviour is detected. It also guar-
antees optimal performance (i.e. as when default objective function of
RPL is used) in no attack scenario, that is, pˆx,y (t) ≈ px,y (t).
Next, we present an agent-based notification scheme to address
the limitations of the proposed trust-based scheme.
6
7 MOBILE AGENT-BASED NOTIFICATION
SCHEME TO STOP THE DISRUPTION OF
THE NETWORK
While the self-referenced trust model proposed in Sec. 5 is able to
detect potentially malicious change and adapt node’s communica-
tion decisions such that the affected area is avoided, it has its own
limitations. The scheme can not completely prevent the disruption
to the network because the network will eventually require recon-
figuration to handle the malicious node, and the adaptation of one
node may be interpreted as malicious behaviour by another. To
address these issues, we present a notification scheme that uses
mobile agents called ANTs (Antilizer Notification ticket) to inform
the base station of suspected malicious behaviour, to bound the
damage of the attack to a specific area, and prevent the spread of
distrust in the network.
First, we introduce the features of ANTs and their working princi-
ple. We show how these are applied to the routing example. Finally,
we discuss how the information carried by ANTs can be authenti-
cated at the base station.
7.1 Overview of the ANT and ANT’s Features
When node x detects a change in network behaviour of its parent y,
it reduces its trustworthiness. In the example of routing this leads to
x changing the routing path (i.e. x chooses a node with the lowest
rank in the neighbourhood). At the same time, x creates an ANT
which does the following:
(1) It migrates from the node x to its new parent y′ while car-
rying the ID of the potentially malicious node (i.e. x ’s old
parent y).
(2) After it successfully migrates to y′, it triggers a broadcast
message to all one-hop neighbours of y′, Ny′(t), to notify
them of potential malicious activity in the neighbourhood,
and to prevent the spread of distrust caused by network
variations.
(3) The ANT then moves to the next hop along the established
route and repeats this process until it reaches the base-
station.
(4) The ANT delivers the ID of the potentially malicious node
to the base-station which decides if node y should be re-
voked/reprogrammed (may involve human interaction).
Next, we further discuss the features of this notification scheme,
as well as the introduced overhead.
Protection at Low Overheads. As described before, an ANT
does two operations: it travels to the base-station along the RPL tree,
and it broadcasts a one-hop message at each hop in the route. Given
a node which has a route to the base station of z-hops, the number
of extra messages introduced by each ANT is 2z + 1. ANT messages
require no more than one data packet of less than 160 bytes. There-
fore, the operations done by ANTs are very lightweight and with
low operational overhead as shown in Sec. 9.3 (less than 1%).
Guarantees for No Attack Scenarios. ANTs will be created
only by nodes that detect a change in network behaviour of their
parent. No ANT will be spawned when no attacks occur, and no ex-
tra communication is required. Our experimental results in Sec. 9.3
show that the percentage of false positive detections is less then
Figure 5: An illustration of a attacker’s neighbourhood
(node y is the attacker that has been chosen by node x as
its parent, x and n1-n5 are honest nodes).
3.4% for α ∈ [0.7, 0.9], and there is a zero performance penalty
when Antilizer is run no attack scenario.
DistinguishesGenuineChange fromMaliciousBehaviour.
When node x detects a malicious behaviour in y it changes to an
alternative route throughy′ (which has the lowest rank in the neigh-
bourhood) and sends its ANT towards the base station (see Fig. 5).
This change increases the traffic of y′. From the perspective of its
neighbours n1 and n2, y′ is likely to be seen as malicious due to its
increasing Tx and Rx. As a result, node y′ is penalized by this false
positive detection, and n1 and n2 switch their routes to n3, which
further spreads distrust. If this spread is left unchecked, nodes will
run out of ’safe’ routes and RPL will be unable to converge to a
stable routing tree.
In our scheme, an ANT created by x triggers a broadcast message
at its new RPL-tree parent y′ ∈ Nx (t). The ANT informs all of the
one-hop neighbours of Ny′(t) (e.g. nodes n1 and n2) of the change
at x . Now instead of flagging y′ as potentially malicious, nodes
allow a certain period of time (a refractory period) to adapt to the
new network behaviour caused by the change of routes of x . ANTs
reduce the number of false positive detections which improves
Antilizer performance and bounds the damage of an attack to a
specific area.
To validate the authenticity of the information provided by ANTs
at the base station, we use a filtering mechanism described next.
7.2 Credibility of Information carried by ANTs
Here we discuss the potential drawbacks of our notification scheme
and scenarios when it can be compromised.
Filtering mechanism to authenticate information. An at-
tacker can use ANTs to flood a network. The attacker can create a
number of ’falsified’ ANTs by switching between its parents. The
base-station would quickly be able to identify this as malicious ac-
tivity as ANTs would arrive at high frequency from a single source.
The flooding of ANTs would also not prevent a node from rout-
ing away from a malicious neighbour. The filtering mechanism at
the base station that is run for individual time slot is presented in
Alg. 2. Parameters θb and θn are user defined, depending on the
requirements on mechanism sensitivity.
Encryption to avoid information alteration. Our attacker
model does not assume the alteration of packet’s content. To mit-
igate these sorts of attacks there is the need of encrypting the
content of ANT messages. This is a natural extension of this work.
Encryption alone is usually not sufficient as an attacker could fetch
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Algorithm 2: Filtering mechanism to authenticate information
Input :ANT(a1, a2): The ANT that carries the ID of the blacklisted
node (a1) and the ID of node that reported blacklisting (a2)
ANTdata ∈ Rixj: A matrix which individual entries indicate
how many times nodes {1, . . . , i } have been blacklisted by nodes
{1, . . . , j } where i, j ∈ S
θb, θn : Parameters that control the filtering mechanism
n: A number of ANT(a1, a2) that arrived within time slot
Output :c ∈ {GD, CA, FP}
1 ANT← 0
2 for l ⇐ 1 · · ·n do
3 ANT(a1, a2) ← ANT(a1, a2) + 1
4 end
5 for k ⇐ 1 · · · i do
6 if |ANT(i, k) | > θb /*where |ANT(i, k) | indicates the number of
non-zero elements of vector*/ then
7 c ← GA /*Genuine attack, i is malicious*/
8 end
9 else if |ANT(i, k) | < θb and max(ANT(i, k)) ≥ θn then
10 c ← CA /*Compromised ANT by k for which ANT(i, k) is
max*/
11 end
12 else
13 c ← FP /*False positive*/
14 end
15 end
16 return c
encrypted packets and replay them. Once again, using the filter-
ing mechanism the base station would detect a large number of
ANTs being send from a single node and would be able to identify
malicious behaviour.
Blacklisting to ensure avoidance. Lastly, we discuss the cost
of losing some ANTs. As Antilizer ensures routing around the
affected areas, nodes will never re-establish routes through poten-
tiallymalicious nodes until these are re-approved by the base station.
If the base station does not receive any ANT reporting malicious
activity, the area affected by that node will still be avoided.
8 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented Antilizer in Contiki [6] version 3.1, an open source
operating system for WSNs and IoT. Contiki provides an IPv6 stack
(uIPv6) and the RPL routing protocol. Our implementation used
both. In this section, we describe key aspects of our implementation.
Mac and IPv6. For the MAC layer, a CSMA/CA driver was used
with default settings in Contiki. The neighbour table size is set to
50. The radio duty cycling is disabled during all our experiments.
The maximum transmission attempts to re-send a packet is 5. In
regards to the IPv6 stack, the packet reassembly service is disabled.
The UIP_CONF_IGNORE_TTL is set to zero to ignore the TTL flag in
the packet headers. The HC6 SICSlowpan header compression is
used.. The application layer generates UDP packets at a fixed rate
of one every four seconds. The size of a data packet is 160 bytes (8
bytes for payload and the rest is used for IPv6 header).
Attacks. Each compromised node xc ∈ N is able to initiate one
or more of the malicious activities described in Sec. 3. We give a
specific description of our attack implementation below:
(1) Sinkhole attack - The node xc advertises falsified rank infor-
mation (i.e. it claims that it’s a sink, Rankxc (t) = RootRankx,
x ∈ R.
(2) Blackhole - A compromised node xc advertises falsified rank
information to lure the traffic and then fails to forward any
data received from it’s neighbours.
(3) Hello Flood - The node xc broadcasts hello packets at a very
high rate to all of its one-hop neighbours y ∈ Nxc (t ).
Routing objective function and metrics retrieval. The RPL
routing protocol is used with the ETX objective function and de-
fault settings. The RPL_MOP_NO_DOWNWARD_ROUTES option is en-
abled since downward routing is not used in our experiments.
DIO_INTERVAL_MIN and DIO_INTERVAL_DOUBLINGS broadcast rout-
ing metadata every 512 to 1024ms.
To implement overhearing, we extended the Contiki network
link stats module. The data is stored in a separate neighbour table
used only by Antilizer. The network metrics Tx and Rx are collected
by callbacks in link stats, whereas the public functions are used to
retrieve the Rankmetric. The minimum Rank with hysteresis objec-
tive function (rpl-mrhof.c) is used as the base when no malicious
behaviour is detected. The expected similarity value is calculated
every 20 seconds for each node in the neighbour table, and used as
a weight for the calculation of that node’s Rank.
Notification via ANTs. The ANTs were implemented using
RPL ICMP6 messages and RPL broadcast messages. When a node
changes it’s next hop neighbour due to a change in rank weight
from Antilizer, it produces an ANT. The first hop of the ANT goes
from the node to its new upstream next hop and contains the IPv6
ID of the node considered malicious. When the ANT is received by
the new upstream node, the receiver sends an IPv6 broadcast to all
of it’s one hop neighbours. The ANT eventually arrives at the base
station where it is verified, and its data used.
9 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of an extensive simulation
study to evaluate the performance of Antilizer.
9.1 Experimental Setup
We performed our evaluation by using the Contiki simulator Cooja.
As a routing protocol, we use the RPL. We consider networks with
25, 50 and 100 nodes randomly distributed over a 100m×100m,
200m×200m, 400m×400m area, respectively. Each node has a Tx
range of 50m and periodically sends out data every 4 seconds with
an initial random offset.
To configure Antilizer we set the number of Monte Carlo samples
tom = 200 with the standard deviation set to σ 2 = 0.35. We use a
hyperbolic cosecant function depicted in Fig. 4. The parameter α is
set to 0.75 as explained in Sec. 9.3. The duration of a time slot is set
to 20 seconds.
We consider a set of attack scenarios in the simulations:
(1) A single attacker in the network exploiting one of three
attacks defined in Sec. 8,
(2) A multi-attacker case where the attackers belong to the same
category of attacks (i.e. we vary an attack for non-intrusive to
an intrusive scenario with 10% of the nodes being malicious).
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Figure 6: Antilizer performance for no attack scenario in 25,
50 and 100 nodes network: (a) Data loss. (b) E2E delay.
Simulations are run for 4 hours of simulation time with the attack
starting time at 20 minutes for a 25 nodes simulation or 40 minutes
for a 50 nodes and 100 nodes simulation.
9.2 Performance Metrics
The effectiveness of Antilizer is evaluated based on the following
metrics:
• End-to-End (E2E) Data Loss - Ratio between the total number
of packets successfully received by the base station and the
number of packets sent by the nodes.
• Average End-to-End (E2E) Delay - Average time needed for a
packet to travel between the source and the base station.
• Overhead - The percentage of additional messages created
upon an incident detection compared to the total number of
messages sent in the network.
• Detection Reliability - Successful detection rate and the false
positive detection rate for various simulation scenarios.
We first evaluate the performance of Antilizer with no attack
scenario to show that there is a zero performance penalty. We then
evaluate the performance of Antilizer with malicious nodes in the
network. Our results show that our system can detect data loss
with high reliability and route around affected areas. These changes
reduce the loss rate that has been caused by the attacks, as well as
the data delivery delay.
9.3 Performance Results
Below, we present the simulation results of our evaluation of An-
tilizer for varied attack scenarios and topologies.
No Attack Scenario. Figure 6 presents the performance of An-
tilizer with no attack scenario. We show that there is a zero perfor-
mance penalty if Antilizer is run in the network with no attacker.
Sinkhole Attack. Antilizer detects a change in the rank and an
increase in receptions and transmissions during a sinkhole attack.
Once detected, nodes reroute communication whilst triggering the
notification scheme. From the Figure 7 we can see that there is no
notable impact on E2E data loss; however routes are compromised
so that data is delayed. Results show that Antilizer keeps the E2E
delay in the presence of sinkhole attack close to normal latency.
The overheads are very low.
Blackhole Attack. During a blackhole attack, Antilizer detects
the drop in transmissions and nodes reroute data whilst triggering
the notification scheme. Figure 8 shows that Antilizer reduces the
data loss down to 1%, but also it keeps the transmission delay closer
to normal latency. The overhead introduced is less then 0.5% across
varied attack intensities.
Figure 7: Antilizer performance for sinkhole attack: (a) - (b)
Data loss and E2E delay (50 nodes, multiple attackers) c) -
d) Data loss and Overhead (25, 50 and 100 nodes, single at-
tacker).
Figure 8: Antilizer performance for blackhole attack: (a) - (b)
Data loss and E2E delay (50 nodes, multiple attackers) c) -
d) Data loss and Overhead (25, 50 and 100 nodes, single at-
tacker).
Hello Flood Attack. Nodes detect an increase in the transmis-
sions of an attacker. The attack drastically increases the overall
number of packets in the network. The transmission delays increase
accordingly as can be seen in Fig. 9. Due to the nature of the attack,
it is not possible to reroute around the affected regions completely
as additional packets are spread across the whole network. How-
ever, all nodes are able to detect the attack and send ANTs to the
base station. The average time needed for a node to detect and
report a hello attacker to the base station is up to two time slots
(40 seconds). Therefore, its effects could be prevented by the base
station in a very short period.
Detection Reliability. The reliability of our detection scheme
and its dependence on the choice of parameter α is shown in Fig. 10.
We performed extensive simulations of three attacks with a single
attacking node in a network of 50 nodes. Detection rates were
calculated as average rates per node. The results show that on
average for α ∈ [0.7, 0.9] Antilizer can identify more that 98.6%
anomalies with only around 3.6% false positive detections. While
α = 0.9 gives the lowest number of false positives, we opted for
more conservative approach and α = 0.75 which ensures a good
sensitivity to all attacks with 99.3% detection reliability.
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Figure 9: Antilizer performance for hello attack: (a) - (b) Data
loss and E2E delay (50 nodes, multiple attackers) c) - d) Data
loss and Overhead (25, 50 and 100 nodes, single attacker).
Figure 10: Antilizer detection reliability for α ∈ [0.5, 0.9] in
50 nodes network (average of four attacks, a single attacker).
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented Antilizer, a novel self-healing scheme
to defend against attacks aimed at network communications. Upon
detecting malicious activities, the system allows data to flow around
affected regions so that the network functionality is not compro-
mised. Our experimental results showed high effectiveness in terms
of data loss rate requiring low operational overheads for varied
attack scenarios.
As part of our future work, we plan to test Antilizer in real test-
bed experiments. Also, we plan to improve the attack diagnosis
component by exploiting reinforcement-learning schemes. This
would support the decision making process at the base station and
further improve Antilizer performance.
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